Profit distribution in some agricultural employment situations

Vasillaq Kedhi ¹, Anjeza Bekolli ²*

¹University of Tirana, Albania
²Agricultural University of Tirana, Albania

Abstract
In the agriculture sector, temporary or seasonal employment is a growing trend. The decision to accept or reject the terms of employment, where assessing the amount of gain from each participating party is of course a critical component. The purpose of this paper, is to provide rational and theoretically based arguments for the choices made. Quantitative analysis based on data collected and case description, can be used following principles and criteria appropriate to certain circumstances, such as the principle of equality, the principle of proportionality, the criterion of marginal contributions, the best of a bad bunch, group disagreement, etc., or a combination of them, is required to achieve the most reasonable and acceptable distribution of work benefits. Although each case of agricultural employment has its own characteristics, we suggest the results of a cooperative game theory to determine a reward measure on the basis of such criteria. The article looks at three distinct employment scenarios in agriculture, both in terms of employer-employee relationships and individual worker productivity. In all three circumstances, the parties (owner and employees) agreed to pay reward based on the net profit made from production at the end of the work season. All three cases have been mathematically modeled as cooperative games, for which substet solutions and one point solutions have been found. A mathematical model is developed based on hypothetical conditions using mathematical notions, which make the paper findings adoptable to real environment problems.

Keywords: cooperative game, coalition, core, subset solutions, one-point solutions.
JEL Codes: C70, C71, C78